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Under the Influence of Alcohol Three
Hours After Driving: The
Constitutionality of the (a)(5)
Amendment to Pennsylvania's DUI
Statute*
I. Introduction
A motorist with a legal blood-alcohol content who shows no
signs of intoxication may be convicted for driving under the
influence of alcohol pursuant to a new Pennsylvania law.' In
addition, proof that the motorist was not under the influence while
driving is irrelevant because the new provision does not concern
behavior while driving.2 Two Pennsylvania trial courts recently
have split on the first-impression issue of whether the new law is
constitutional.3
Pennsylvania's Driving-Under-the-Influence (DUI) Statute was
amended in December 1992 to add subsection (a)(5).4 The pre-
* The author notes that the use of parallel citations to Pennsylvania reporters is
intended to facilitate further research of this topic.
1. 75 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3731 (Supp. 1995).
2. See infra notes 250-54 and accompanying text.
3. Commonwealth v. Gumbert, 44 Cumb. L.J. 186 (1994)(upholding the law as
constitutional). Contra Commonwealth v. Barud, 143 Pitt. Legal J. 7 (1994) (declaring the
law unconstitutional). The Pennsylvania Superior Court has since upheld the law in
Commonwealth v. Brehm, 444 Pa. Super. Ct. 138, 663 A.2d 712 (1995), by affirming the
decision of the common pleas court that the law is constitutional. Id.; see also Common-
wealth v. Rishel, 441 Pa. Super. Ct. 584, 658 A.2d 352 (1995) (addressing the constitutionality
of § 3731(a)(5) in part). The Pennsylvania Supreme Court will nevertheless address the
same issue in the appeal of Commonwealth v. Barud, because statutory law provides for a
direct appeal to the supreme court in any case when a law of the Commonwealth is ruled
unconstitutional. 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 722(7) (1975).
4. 75 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3731(a)(5). The section provides:
(a) A person shall not drive, operate or be in actual physical control of the
movement of any vehicle:
(5) if the amount of alcohol by weight in the blood of a person is 0.10% or
greater at the time of a chemical test of a sample of the person's breath, blood or
urine, which sample is:
DICKINSON LAW REVIEW
existing law of subsection (a)(4) prohibits a person from having a
blood-alcohol content (BAC) by weight of 0.10% or greater while
driving.5 The law became criticized as insufficient when develop-
ing case law suggested that BAC tests of blood samples drawn a
significant time after driving were inconclusive in determining the
person's BAC while driving.6 Subsection (a)(5) widens the scope
of subsection (a)(4) by prohibiting a person from having a BAC of
0.10% by weight within three hours, or a reasonable additional
time, after driving.7 Although the Pennsylvania legislature enacted
subsection (a)(5) to settle the controversy of delayed blood-alcohol
tests, the recent conflicting decisions on its constitutionality have
sparked a new DUI testing controversy.'
On September 9, 1994, the Cumberland County Court of
Common Pleas upheld the constitutionality of subsection (a)(5) in
Commonwealth v. Gumbert.9 Only ten days later, the Allegheny
County Court of Common Pleas struck down the provision as
unconstitutional in Commonwealth v. Barud.t° In light of this
divergence of authority, this Comment examines subsection (a)(5)
and its constitutionality.
Part II of this Comment traces the apparent problems under
Pennsylvania's pre-existing DUI law and suggests the problems did
not warrant legislative action. Part III covers the enactment of
subsection (a)(5) and examines its language. Part IV of this
Comment analyzes the challenges to the constitutionality of
(i) obtained within three hours after the person drove, operated or was in
actual physical control of the vehicle; or
(ii) if the circumstances of the incident prevent collecting the sample within
three hours, obtained within a reasonable additional time after the person
drove, operated or was in actual physical control of the vehicle.
Id.
5. 75 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3731(a)(4) (1982). Section 3731(a)(4) of the
Pennsylvania Motor Vehicle Code provides:
(a) A person shall not drive, operate or be in actual physical control of the
movement of any vehicle:
(4) while the amount of alcohol by weight in the blood of a person is 0.10% or
greater.
Id.
6. See Commonwealth v. Jarman, 529 Pa. 92, 601 A.2d 1229 (1992); Commonwealth
v. Modaffare, 529 Pa. 101, 601 A.2d 1233 (1992); infra part II.B.3.
7. 75 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3731(a)(5).
8. See infra part IV.
9. 44 Cumb. L.J. 186 (1994).
10. 143 Pitt. Legal J. 7 (1994).
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subsection (a)(5). Part V discusses the pending appeal of Com-
monwealth v. Barud to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court" and
evaluates how the supreme court will treat the issue. Although the
challenges to section 3731(a)(5) have merit, this Comment
concludes that the Pennsylvania Supreme Court will uphold the
constitutionality of Pennsylvania Motor Vehicle Code section
3731(a)(5).
II. Development of Pennsylvania's Drunk Driving Law
A. Historical Background
Drunk driving laws reflect a state's duty to protect the public
health, safety, and welfare through its police powers.12 The state
has broad powers to regulate the use of alcoholic beverages as
related to safe and efficient functioning of the nation's highways.13
The duty, however, becomes increasingly difficult as the nation's
drunk driving problem continues to rise to epidemic proportions.t4
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court has even commented that the
high number of alcohol-related accidents creates a societal problem
"of frightening and epidemic dimensions."15
11. 143 Pitt. Legal J. 7 (1994), appeal docketed, No. 64 W.D. (Pa. Oct. 31, 1994).
12. Commonwealth v. Mikulan, 504 Pa. 244, 247-48, 470 A.2d 1339, 1340 (1983) (citing
Gambone v. Commonwealth, 375 Pa. 547, 550-551, 101 A.2d 634 (1954)).
13. Id.
14. The Mikulan court quoted the United States Supreme Court's description of the
epidemic in South Dakota v. Neville, 459 U.S. 553, 558-59 (1983):
The situation underlying this case - that of the drunk driver - occurs with
tragic frequency on our Nation's highways. The carnage caused by drunk drivers
is well documented and needs no detailed recitation here. This Court, although
not having the daily contact with the problem that the state courts have, has
repeatedly lamented the tragedy. See Breithaupt v. Abram, 352 US 432, 439, 1 L
Ed 2d 448, 77 S Ct 408 [412] (1957) ("The increasing slaughter on our highways,
most of which should be avoidable, now reaches the astounding figures only heard
of on the battlefield"); Tate v. Short, 401 US 395, 401, 28 L Ed 2d 130, 91 S Ct
668 (1971) (Blackmun, J., concurring) (deploring "traffic irresponsibility and the
frightful carnage it spews upon our highways"); Perez v. Campbell, 402 US 637,
657 and 672, 29 L Ed 2d 233, 91 S Ct 1704 [1715 and 1722] (1971) (Blackmun, J.,
concurring) ("The slaughter on the highways of this Nation exceeds the death toll
of all our wars"); Mackey v. Montrym, 443 U.S. 1, 17-19, 61 L.Ed.2d. 321, 99 S Ct
2612 [2620-2621] (1979) (recognizing the "compelling interest in highway safety").
504 Pa. at 248-49, 470 A.2d at 1341.
15. Mikulan, 504 Pa. at 249, 470 A.2d at 1341. The supreme court noted the "grim"
alcohol-related traffic accident statistics for 1982: "800 people killed in 684 traffic accidents;
19,499 people seriously injured in 12,508 accidents ...." Id.
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The Commonwealth began to enforce a drunk driving law as
early as 1909.16 Although the early law simply prohibited opera-
tion of a motor vehicle while intoxicated,17 the statute was
expanded in 1919 to preclude driving "while under the influence of
intoxicating liquor or any narcotic or habit producing drug ....
The drunk driving law remained virtually unchanged 9 until
1976,20 when the legislature redrafted the law to prohibit driving
under the influence of alcohol to the extent that the driver is
"incapable of safe driving."'
To convict a defendant under the 1976 law, the Common-
wealth used BAC test results2 2 along with statutory presumptions
that certain BAC levels implied intoxication.' Guilt beyond a
reasonable doubt, however, remained difficult to prove without
corroborating physical evidence.24  Corroboration was vital
because the BAC presumptions of intoxication alone, at times, had
little effect on factfinders.25  Even with the use of expert testimo-
16. Act of Apr. 27, 1909, ch. 9, 1909 Pa. Laws 265.
17. Id.
18. Act of June 30, 1919, ch. 23, 1919 Pa. Laws 678. Although the inclusion of
controlled substance use was an important addition to the statute that is presently codified
at 75 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 3731(a)(2), this Comment does not consider issues of controlled
substance use under the Motor Vehicle Code.
19. The 1959 version of the law, however, added interesting categories of vehicles that
fell under the scope of the statute: "It shall be unlawful for any person to operate a motor
vehicle, tractor, streetcar or trackless trolley omnibus, while under the influence ...." Act
of Apr. 29, 1959, ch. 1037, 1959 Pa. Laws 58.
20. Act of June 17, 1976, Pa. Laws 162, § 1, as amended, Dec. 15, 1982, Pa. Laws 1268,
§ 9, effective in 30 days (codified as amended at 75 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3731 (1982)).
21. 75 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3731(a)(1) (1982). The paragraph specifically provided:
(a) A person shall not drive, operate or be in actual physical control of the
movement of any motor vehicle while:
(1) under the influence of alcohol to a degree which renders the person
incapable of safe driving.
Id.
22. Id. § 1547(c). The section permits results of chemical tests of breath, blood or urine
to be admissible in evidence in § 3731 prosecutions.
23. Id. § 1547(d). A BAC test result of 0.05% or less creates a presumption that the
person tested was not under the influence of alcohol. A result between 0.05% and 0.10%
creates no presumption, and a result of 0.10% or greater creates a presumption that the
person tested was under the influence of alcohol. Id.
24. Examples of corroborating physical evidence sufficient to determine intoxication are
erratic driving, slurred speech, staggering gait, bloodshot eyes, and failure of field sobriety
tests. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Hamme, 400 Pa. Super. Ct. 537, 583 A.2d 1245 (1990);
Commonwealth v. McClellan, 42 Cumb. L.J. 312, 318 (1993).
25. The Pennsylvania Superior Court in Ackerman v. Delcomico, 336 Pa. Super. Ct. 569,
577, 486 A.2d 410, 414 (1984), concluded: "Although the admission of the blood alcohol
content has been condoned by this court . . . , we remain skeptical as to the value of this
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ny explaining the effects of certain BAC levels on the body to a
jury, the defense could rebut the BAC presumptions with expert
testimony demonstrating that the person was capable of safe
driving despite his or her BAC level.26
The difficulty of proving guilt under the 1976 law, coupled with
rising alcohol-related fatalities on Pennsylvania roadways,
27
demanded legislative action. The legislature responded by enacting
Pennsylvania Motor Vehicle Code section 3731(a)(4).
B. The "Illegal Per Se" Law of Section 3731(a) (4)
In 1982, the General Assembly of Pennsylvania attempted to
solve the drunk driving enforcement problem by adding' an
"illegal per se"29 law to the statute, thereby making it illegal to
drive while having a BAC of 0.10%30 or greater.31 Proof of the
requisite BAC level alone is a violation of the statute, and the need
for corroborating evidence or expert testimony seemingly was
eliminated by the amendment. The per se law, however, was
challenged in Commonwealth v. Mikulan.32
evidence to the jury. Without explanation, the blood alcohol content has little meaning to
factfinders .... " Furthermore, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court in Commonwealth v.
DiFrancesco, 458 Pa. 188, 193 n.3, 329 A.2d 204, 207 n.3 (1975), noted that "[w]hat the
statute refers to as a 'presumption' is, strictly speaking only a standardized permissible
inference."
26. Edwin W. Tompkins III, The New Pennsylvania Drunk Driving Law: Last Call for
the One-for-the-Road Era, 87 DICK. L. REV. 805 (1983).
27. Alcohol-related fatal accidents in Pennsylvania increased one hundred and fifty-four
percent in the ten years leading up the 1982 drunk driving law amendment. Id. at 805.
28. The new law did not repeal the prior standard, see supra note 21, but rather created
an additional, alternative standard for conviction under the statute.
29. An "illegal per se" law creates a crime that can be proven solely through objective
scientific criteria. See People v. Cancel, 520 N.Y.S.2d 509, 512 (N.Y. Crim. Ct. 1987). The
prosecution need only show that the defendant had a BAC of 0.10% or greater while driving
to prove the defendant guilty of driving under the influence of alcohol pursuant to 75 PA.
CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3731(a)(4) (1982). Commonwealth v. Mikulan, 504 Pa. 244, 256, 470
A.2d 1339, 1343 (1983).
30. The Mikulan opinion suggested that a 1979 United States Department of
Transportation issue paper entitled "Alcohol Countermeasures Illegal Per Se and Preliminary
Breath Testing" influenced passage of this law. Mikulan, 504 Pa. at 250,470 A.2d at 1341-42.
The paper recommended enactment of "illegal per se laws" prohibiting driving with a BAC
level of 0.10% or greater. Id. The 0.10% figure as the unsafe BAC level for driving seems
to have been derived from a 1960 House of Delegates of the American Medical Association
policy statement. Id. at 250-51, 470 A.2d at 1342.
31. Act of June 17, 1976, Pa. Laws 162, § 1, as amended, Dec. 15, 1982, Pa. Laws 1268,
§ 9, effective in 30 days (codified as amended at 75 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3731 (1982)).
32. 504 Pa. 244, 470 A.2d 1339 (1983).
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1. Constitutionality Challenge to Section 3731(a)(4).- In
Commonwealth v. Mikulan, the Commonwealth charged the
defendant with driving while his BAC was over 0.10% pursuant to
Pennsylvania Motor Vehicle Code section 3731(a)(4).33 The Court
of Common Pleas granted the defendant's motion to dismiss the
information and declared section 3731(a)(4) unconstitutional under
the void-for-vagueness doctrine.34 The Commonwealth filed a
direct appeal to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court.35 The supreme
court reversed the decision and upheld the constitutionality of
section 3731(a)(4).36
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court in Mikulan began its review
by noting the heavy burden of persuasion on the moving party in
challenging the constitutionality of a legislative act.37 Writing for
the court, Justice Rolf Larsen noted that the court would not
declare legislation unconstitutional unless it "clearly, palpably and
plainly" violates the constitution.38 The defendant challenged
section 3731(a)(4) under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment to the United States Constitution, which protects
individuals against arbitrary state action.39  Specifically, the void-
for-vagueness doctrine requires that "a penal statute define the
criminal offense with sufficient definiteness that ordinary people
can understand what conduct is prohibited and in a manner that
does not encourage arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement. '
33. Id. at 246, 470 A.2d at 1340. The Commonwealth brought the § 3731(a)(4) charge
on April 4, 1983, less than two months after the statute provision became effective. Id.
34. Coincidentally, the same Allegheny County Court of Common Pleas that here
declared subsection (a)(4) unconstitutional would later declare subsection (a)(5) unconstitu-
tional as well. Visiting Senior Judge John J. Brodley presided over the Mikulan case, while
Judge Walter R. Little would later strike down subsection (a)(5) in Commonwealth v. Barud,
143 Pitt. Legal J. 7 (1994).
35. Counsel filed the direct appeal pursuant to 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 722(7), which
allows direct appeals from orders of courts of common pleas declaring a statute of the
Commonwealth invalid as repugnant to the Constitution of the United States or of the
Commonwealth. Mikulan, 504 Pa. at 247 n.5, 470 A.2d at 1340 n.5.
36. The arguments and analysis of the void-for-vagueness doctrine presented in Mikulan
are reviewed here in some detail because the analysis of § 3731(a)(5) involves the same
general challenges. See infra part IV.
37. Mikulan, 504 Pa. at 247, 470 A.2d at 1340 (citing Snider v. Thornburgh, 496 Pa. 159,
166,436 A.2d 593, 596 (1981); Commonwealth v. Barnes & Tucker Co., 472 Pa. 115,123, 371
A.2d 461, 465 (1977), appeal dismissed, 434 U.S. 807 (1977)).
38. Id. (citing Snider, 496 Pa. at 166, 436 A.2d at 596).
39. Id. at 250, 470 A.2d at 1342.
40. Id. at 251,470 A.2d at 1342 (quoting Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 355 (1983)).
[Vol. 100:2
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The doctrine primarily requires that legislation establish minimal
guidelines to govern law enforcement."
The supreme court found that the defendant did not meet his
burden of showing that section 3731(a)(4) was unconstitutionally
vague because he could not prove that an ordinary person does not
have fair notice of prohibited conduct under the statute or that the
section encourages arbitrary enforcement.42 The court dismissed
as "overtly technical and misperceive[d]" the defendant's fair notice
argument that a person cannot contemplate forbidden conduct
under the section because one does not know when one's BAC
reaches 0.10%. 43 Finally, the court disposed of any argument that
the section allows for arbitrary and erratic enforcement by
concluding that the section limits discretion by requiring a specific
BAC reading.44
The supreme court in Mikulan reversed the trial court decision
and held section 3731(a)(4) constitutional.45 Although subsection
(a)(4) survived its void-for-vagueness constitutionality challenge,
subsequent judicial interpretations of the law created a more
formidable challenge to its validity.
2. Extrapolation Burden of Section 3731(a) (4).- Neither
section 3731(a)(4) nor its companion section governing chemical
testing, section 1547, provide any requisite time frame within which
blood-alcohol tests must be administered. 46 Although section
3731(a)(4) does not require proof of impairment while driving, it
does require proof that the suspect's BAC was 0.10% or greater
while driving.47 While a BAC test result of 0.10% or greater
taken a short time after driving creates a strong inference of guilt
under section 3731(a)(4), the inference weakens when significant
time lapses between vehicle operation and chemical testing.
4
41. Id. (quoting Kolender, 461 U.S. at 355). Without such guidelines, the executive and
judicial branches of government may be susceptible to personal predilections. Id. at 251, 470
A.2d at 1342-43.
42. Mikulan, at 252-53, 470 A.2d at 1343.
43. Id. at 252, 470 A.2d at 1343. Conversely, the Mikulan court found, "The legislature
has squarely, and fairly, placed the risk of erroneous judgment of alcohol consumption on
the person who has the choice, the drinking driver .... " Id. at 255, 470 A.2d at 1344.
44. Id. at 253 n.8, 470 A.2d at 1343 n.8.
45. Id. at 262, 470 A.2d at 1348.
46. For the text of §§ 3731(a)(4) and 1547(d), see supra notes 5 and 23, respectively.
47. See supra note 29 and accompanying text.
48. Commonwealth v. Jarman, 529 Pa. 92, 96, 601 A.2d 1229, 1230-31 (1992).
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Defendants have argued to no avail that such delayed BAC
test results are irrelevant to BAC levels while driving and should
not be admissible.49 The courts have deemed delayed test results
admissible, but the results carry less weight for the factfinder than
test results obtained at a time more reflective of a person's BAC
while driving.5" Thus, prosecutors seek to use expert testimony to
extrapolate or "relate back" subsequent BAC test results in order
to determine conclusively a person's BAC while driving."
In Commonwealth v. Gonzalez,52 the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court addressed whether blood test results showing a BAC of
0.09% obtained three hours after an accident were admissible and
whether expert extrapolation testimony relating the test results
back to the time of driving was admissible.53 The supreme court
ruled that the delayed blood test results were relevant and
admissible to the charges under Motor Vehicle Code sections
3731(a)(1) and 3731(a)(4).54 At trial, the prosecution presented
expert extrapolation testimony that the defendant's BAC level may
have been as high as 0.125% at the time of the violation.5 The
49. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Tylwalk, 258 Pa. Super. Ct. 506, 393 A.2d 473 (1978)
(holding that a four and one-half hour delay between vehicle operation and the administra-
tion of a blood-alcohol test affected the weight but not the evidence of the blood test
results); Commonwealth v. Trefry, 249 Pa. Super. Ct. 117, 375 A.2d 786 (1977) (holding that
a one and one-half hour delay between vehicle operation and the administration of a blood-
alcohol test did not render the results inadmissible in a driving-under-the-influence charge).
50. John D. LaRocca, Recent Case, 62 TEMP. L.Q. 757 n.3 (1989).
51. The following excerpt provides a brief explanation of "relating back" and how it is
used in DUI prosecutions:
"Relating back" or "extrapolation" evidence is typically introduced in the form of
expert testimony. See E. CLEARY, MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE, § 205, at 616 (3d
ed. 1984) (expert testimony ordinarily required to establish that operator's
measured blood alcohol content ("BAC") indicates intoxication during period in
issue). Extrapolation is the process of projecting data, by using inferences, into
an unknown area and thus achieving a conjectural knowledge of the unknown.
NEW WEBSTER'S DICrIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 349 (1981). The
expert applies several factors to the operator's blood alcohol test results ... to
estimate the operator's BAC at the time of vehicle operation .... These factors
typically include the rate of alcohol absorption and evaporation, the lapse of time
between the testing and operation of the vehicle, and the lapse of time between
the operator's last drink and the operation of the vehicle.
Id. at 757 n.3.
52. 519 Pa. 116, 546 A.2d 26 (1988).
53. Id.
54. For the text of §§ 3731(a)(1) and 3731(a)(4), see supra notes 21 and 5.
55. Gonzalez, 519 Pa. at 134, 546 A.2d at 35.
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court found this evidence too speculative and ruled it inadmissible
with respect to the section 3731(a)(4) charge.
56
The Gonzalez holding inferred that the Commonwealth
needed accurate extrapolation evidence to prove a section 3731
(a)(4) violation when the person registered a BAC of less than
0.10% a significant time after driving.57 Producing detailed
extrapolation testimony under 3731(a)(4) burdened the Common-
wealth since the factors vital to calculate an accurate extrapola-
tion" usually he solely with the defendant. This burden made
section 3731(a)(4) convictions difficult under facts similar to those
in Gonzalez. In addition, both Commonwealth v. Jarman' and
Commonwealth v. Modaffare6' appeared to increase the weight of
the prosecution's burden even further.
In Commonwealth v. Jarman, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court
considered whether a blood-alcohol test result of 0.114% taken one
hour after vehicle operation was sufficient to sustain a conviction
under section 3731(a)(4).62 Writing for the majority, Justice John
P. Flaherty63 first set forth the standard that the evidence must be
viewed in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth as the
verdict winner.' 4 The defendant relied upon Gonzalez to argue
that the Commonwealth's expert testimony on extrapolation was
"sufficiently ambiguous" as to force the jury to speculate on the
issue of the defendant's BAC while driving.65
56. Id Conversely, the supreme court found that the same expert testimony was
relevant and admissible to the § 3731(a)(1) inquiry of whether the defendant was driving
under the influence of alcohol to a degree which rendered him incapable of safe driving. Id.
57. LaRocca, supra note 50, at 765 n.43.
58. Such factors include time and content of the defendant's last meal, and the time and
amount of consumed alcoholic beverages. Id. at 757 n.3.
59. Id. at 766 n.53 (citing State v. Sutliff, 547 P.2d 1128, 1130 (Idaho 1976)).
60. 529 Pa. 92, 601 A.2d 1229 (1992).
61. 529 Pa. 101, 601 A.2d 1233 (1992).
62. Jarman, 529 Pa. at 94, 601 A.2d at 1230. The Commonwealth also charged the
defendant under § 3731(a)(1), but the trial court acquitted the defendant of this charge. Id.
The trial court convicted the defendant pursuant to § 3731(a)(4), and the Pennsylvania
Superior Court affirmed the conviction at 398 Pa. Super. Ct. 645, 573 A.2d 620 (1992). Id.
at 92, 601 A.2d at 1229.
63. In light of Justice Flaherty's dissent in Commonwealth v. Mikulan, 504 Pa. 244, 270,
470 A.2d 1339, 1352 (1983) (Flaherty, J., dissenting) (arguing against the constitutionality of
§ 3731(a)(4) under the void-for-vagueness doctrine), it is appropriate that he write the two
decisions that caused the legislature to amend its driving-under-the-influence law.
64. Jarman, 529 Pa. at 94, 601 A.2d at 1230 (citing Commonwealth v. Hughes, 521 Pa.
423, 430, 555 A.2d 1264, 1267 (1989)).
65. Id. at 95, 601 A.2d at 1340.
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The Commonwealth expert in Jarman testified that the peak
alcohol level is crucial to extrapolation: "[A] person's blood-alcohol
level fluctuates with the passage of time, such that the level
gradually rises after drinks have been consumed until a peak is
reached roughly sixty to ninety minutes after drinking has ceased,
and that, thereafter, the level slowly declines."66 The Common-
wealth failed to show whether the defendant's 0.114% BAC level
was rising or falling at the time of the test one hour after driv-
ing.67 Consequently, the court found that the expert could not
offer an opinion as to whether defendant's BAC was 0.10% or
greater while driving.68 Lacking any meaningful extrapolation, the
evidence forced the jury to speculate on the defendant's BAC level
while driving.69 As a result, the supreme court agreed with the
defendant that the evidence Was insufficient, even when viewed
most favorably for the Commonwealth, and reversed the convic-
tion.7°
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court used the Jarman decision to
exploit the inherent limits of Pennsylvania's DUI statute and the
subsequent difficulty of extrapolating the peak blood-alcohol
content of a person in borderline DUI cases. Unlike other states'
drunk driving statutes, 71 the scope of Pennsylvania's DUI was
limited strictly to one's blood-alcohol content while driving. The
Jarman court noted that the plain language of the statute con-
strained the court's application of the law and deferred to the
legislature any argument to change the law.
72
66. Id. at 96, 601 A.2d at 1231. The expert witness was the director of the hospital
laboratory where the defendant's blood test was performed, and his testimony was
uncontradicted. Id.
67. The defendant testified that he finished the last of his four or five beers in a bar at
9:00 p.m. on the night in question just prior to departing in his vehicle. Id. at 96, 601 A.2d
at 1231. Based upon the testimony of the Commonwealth's expert witness, the defendant
concluded that his blood-alcohol level likely peaked sometime after he was stopped, perhaps
even after the blood test was done. Id. at 97, 601 A.2d at 1231. He argued that since his
BAC was 0.114% and rising one hour after driving, it likely was less than 0.10% while
driving. Id. The Commonwealth's expert witness corroborated this testimony. Id.
68. Id.
69. Jarman, 529 Pa. at 97, 601 A.2d 1231. It is well-settled law that a criminal conviction
cannot be based upon mere speculation or conjecture. Commonwealth v. Holzer, 480 Pa.
93, 98, 389 A.2d 101, 104 (1978).
70. Id. at 97, 601 A.2d at 1231.
71. Justice Flaherty referred to the New York case of People v. Mertz, 497 N.E.2d 657
(N.Y. 1986), which cited various state statutes on drunk driving. Jarman, 529 Pa. at 95, 601
A.2d at 1230.
72. Jarman, 529 Pa. at 95 n.1, 601 A.2d at 1230 n.1.
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The Pennsylvania Supreme Court applied its rationale in
Jarman in a similar case, Commonwealth v. Modaffare.7  The
supreme court considered whether a BAC test result of 0.108%
from a blood sample drawn one hour and fifty minutes after the
defendant's accident provided sufficient evidence for conviction
under section 3731(a)(4).74 Although the Commonwealth's expert
witness opined that the defendant's BAC level probably was
declining at the time of the blood test, he testified under cross-
examination that the BAC level may have peaked between the
time of the accident and the time when the blood sample was
drawn.7" As a result, the expert was not able to offer any opinion
as to whether the defendant's BAC was 0.10% or greater at the
time of the accident.76 Following its reasoning under the Jarman
decision, the supreme court in Modaffare deemed the evidence
insufficient and reversed the conviction."
Jarman and Modaffare simply represent borderline cases in
which the Commonwealth could not prove the defendant's guilt
under section 3731(a)(4) beyond a reasonable doubt. The Jarman
and Modaffare decisions, however, created doubt about the
enforceability of section 3731(a)(4) and fostered a false need for
legislative action.
3. The Overreaction to Jarman and Modaffare.- Common-
wealth v. Jarman and Commonwealth v. Modaffare were borderline
section 3731(a)(4) cases in which the defendants registered BAC
levels of 0.114% and 0.108%, respectively, a significant time period
after driving.78 The Commonwealth could not obtain section
3731(a)(4) convictions in those cases because the factual evidence
was insufficient, not because the statute is unworkable.79 Simply
73. 529 Pa. 101, 601 A,2d 1233 (1992). Both Jarman and Modaffare were decided on
January 22, 1992.
74. Id. at 103, 601 A.2d at 1234. Like defendant Jarman, defendant Modaffare was
originally charged under both sections 3731(a)(1) and 3731(a)(4), acquitted on the (a)(1)
charge at trial, and convicted of the (a)(4) charge. Id.
75. Id. at 105, 601 A.2d at 1235.
76. Id.
77. Id. at 107, 601 A.2d at 1236.
78. Jarman, 529 Pa. at 94, 601 A.2d at 1230; Modaffare, 529 Pa. at 103,601 A.2d at 1234.
79. For example, the problem Would lie with the statute if the defendants in Jarman and




because the facts of Jarman and Modaffare demanded extrapola-
tion8' by the Commonwealth does not mean all section 3731(a)(4)
prosecutions require extrapolation. Subsequent case law correctly
interprets Jarman and Modaffare as narrow fact-based holdings that
did not warrant legislative action.
The Pennsylvania Superior Court interpreted the reasoning of
Jarman in Commonwealth v. Osborne.8 The Osborne court
recalled the supreme court's reasoning in Jarman that significantly
high BAC test results taken shortly after vehicle operation created
a strong inference of guilt, but delayed BAC test results that barely
exceeded 0.10% weaken the inference of guilt.82 The stlperior
court then related this inference to the need for extrapolation.83
Since the supreme court failed to establish criteria for determining
"significantly high" BAC levels and "timely" tests, the superior
court reasoned that "the stronger the inference of guilt, the less
significant is the necessity for relating back. Conversely, the
weaker the inference of guilt, the more vital is the necessity for
evidence of relating back an accused's BAC test result to the time
of driving."84  Although this finding created only a very broad
guideline, Osborne proposed that the Commonwealth need not
always present extrapolation evidence to obtain section 3731(a)(4)
convictions.
85
The superior court followed its Osborne precedent in subse-
quent rulings to determine whether the Commonwealth needed
expert extrapolation evidence to sustain section 3731(a)(4)
80. Extrapolation as used here is the science of relating back subsequent BAC test result
levels to determine the driver's BAC while driving. See supra note 51.
81. 414 Pa. Super. Ct. 124, 606 A.2d 529 (1992).
82. Jarman, 529 Pa. at 96, 601 A.2d at 1231. The supreme court in Jarman specifically
found:
In cases where test results show levels of alcohol significantly above 0.10% and
where blood samples have been obtained soon after suspects have been stopped,
there is a very strong inference that blood alcohol levels were in the prohibited
range while driving. However, where ... the blood test result barely exceeded the
0.10% level and the lapse of time between driving and the taking of the blood
sample was not insignificant, the inference of guilt is weakened.
Id.
83. Osborne, 414 Pa. Super. Ct. at 128, 606 A.2d at 531.
84. Id.
85. Under the specific facts of Osborne, the court reversed the defendant's conviction,
holding that a BAC test result of 0.1488% taken fifty minutes after driving was insufficient
evidence without extrapolation by the Commonwealth. Id. The superior court did not infer
guilt because it found the fifty-minute delay significant and the 0.1488% BAC not
significantly high as to infer a 0.10% BAC while driving. Id.
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convictions under varied fact scenarios. In Commonwealth v.
Stith86 and Commonwealth v. Proctor,7 the superior court found
that the respective facts of the cases required extrapolation by the
Commonwealth to sustain the convictions. In Commonwealth v.
Kasunic,88 Commonwealth v. Loeper,89 and Commonwealth v.
Mukina,90 however, the Commonwealth did not need to extrapo-
late test results to sustain convictions because the respective facts
satisfied the inference of guilt established in Osborne. This line of
cases demonstrates that the judiciary has distinguished the
potentially misleading holdings of Jarman and Modaffare by
necessitating extrapolation only when required by the facts of the
case.
Critics of this case-by-case determination of whether the facts
demand extrapolation maintain that requiring the Commonwealth
to offer accurate extrapolation testimony in any case in which guilt
is not obvious overly burdens the prosecution. 9 In his dissent to
Jarman, Pennsylvania Supreme Court Justice Ralph J. Cappy
expressed his view that such case-by-case review of every convic-
tion similar to Jarman will prove section 3731(a)(4) a "virtually
unenforceable and unworkable law."92  The judiciary, however,
settled this argument in the recent Pennsylvania Supreme Court
case of Commonwealth v. Yarger.
93
In Yarger, the supreme court squarely addressed the issue of
whether the precedent set by Jarman and Modaffare required the
Commonwealth to present expert extrapolation testimony to
establish that a driver had a BAC of 0.10% or greater while
86. 434 Pa. Super. Ct. 501, 644 A.2d 193 (1994) (requiring Commonwealth expert
testimony to extrapolate a 0.12% BAC test result taken forty minutes after driving).
87. 425 Pa. Super. Ct. 527, 625 A.2d 1221 (1993) (holding evidence of a 0.179% BAC
taken approximately two hours after driving is insufficient to support a § 3731(a)(4)
conviction without expert extrapolation by the Commonwealth).
88. 423 Pa. Super. Ct. 112, 620 A.2d 525 (1993) (finding the Commonwealth was not
required to extrapolate a BAC test result of 0.21% taken fifty minutes after the defendant
ceased driving).
89. 423 Pa. Super. Ct. 32, 620 A.2d 25 (1993) (holding that a BAC test result of 0.14%
taken two hours after driving did not require extrapolation because the additional physical
evidence of the defendant's slurred speech and unsteady gait was sufficient for conviction).
90. 422 Pa. Super. Ct. 455, 619 A.2d 766 (19930 (holding extrapolation by Common-
wealth unnecessary when a BAC test result of 0.204% was taken one hour after arrest).
91. See Jarman, 529 Pa. at 100, 601 A.2d at 1233 (Cappy, J., dissenting).
92. Id.
93. 538 Pa. 329, 648 A.2d 529 (1994).
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driving.94 The supreme court agreed with Justice Cappy's earlier
assertion in Jarman that case-by-case review would overly burden
the Commonwealth and prove section 3731(a)(4) unworkable.95
The court held that the Commonwealth is not required to present
expert testimony to relate back BAC test results to the time of
driving.96 Once the Commonwealth has established that the
driver's BAC was 0.10% or greater, the prosecution has made a
prima facie case under section 3731(a)(4). 97 The defendant can
then introduce expert testimony to rebut the prima facie evidence,
and the Commonwealth may then present its own expert witness.9"
The Yarger decision helps to clarify the problems of extrapolation
in Jarman and Modaffare and proves section 3731(a)(4) a viable
and sufficient DUI law.
Commonwealth v. Yarger demonstrates that legislative action
in response to Jarman and Modaffare was unnecessary. The unease
created by Jarman and Modaffare, however, caused a knee-jerk
reaction by the Pennsylvania legislature before the case law could
fully develop. The General Assembly responded prematurely to
Jarman and Modaffare and quickly enacted section 3731(a)(5) in
December of 1992.
III. Enactment of Section 3731(a)(5)
The General Assembly added section 3731(a)(5) to Pennsylva-
nia's DUI statute to help alleviate the Commonwealth's burden
under subsection (a)(4) when delayed blood tests produced
borderline results.99 The new subsection prohibits driving by a
person whose BAC is 0.10% or greater at the time of a chemical
test of a sample taken within three hours, or a reasonable addition-
al time, of driving.1" The new amendment has caused changes
in both the structure and philosophy of Pennsylvania's DUI statute.
The legislature altered the mechanical structure of subsection
(a) to compensate the language and intent of paragraph (5). Prior
to the amendment, the premise of subsection (a) contained the
word "while," because paragraphs (1) through (4) all prohibited
94. Id. at 331, 648 A.2d at 531.
95. Id. at 334-35, 648 A.2d at 531.
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. Yarger, 538 Pa. at 334-35, 648 A.2d at 531.
99. See PA. HOUSE LEGIS J., Nov. 17, 1992, at 1853.
100. For the complete text of subsection (a)(5), see supra note 4.
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certain behavior "while" driving.1"' Because paragraph (5)
contains an offense not related to behavior while driving, the
"while" was removed from subsection (a) and inserted at the
beginning of each of the paragraphs (1) through (4). This mechani-
cal change evidences the change in philosophy that driving "while"
under the influence is no longer the only offense under section
3731(a). Subsection (a)(1) was added along with subsection (a)(5)
to provide an affirmative defense to the new provision under
(a)(5)."° The accused may defend on the grounds that he or she
consumed alcohol after the last instance of driving, and his or her
BAC would not have exceeded 0.10% but for such consump-
tion. 3
The General Assembly chose to limit the reach of section
3731(a)(5) to BAC tests results of samples taken within three hours
after driving.1 4 The rationale behind selecting three hours as the
operative time frame lacks legislative explanation, 5 but it ap-
pears to represent a compromise position between the two- and
four-hour provisions selected by other states.'16 The legislature
added a second clause to the provision which extends the three-
hour period to a "reasonable additional time" when circumstances
prevent collection of the sample within the provided three
hours."t The clause most likely applies when a serious accident
has occurred and the driver is hospitalized, or when the suspect
leaves the accident scene and is apprehended some time later.
Prosecutors likely will test the boundaries, however, of what
circumstances justifiably prevent the taking of a sample within
three hours.
The General Assembly amended Pennsylvania's DUI statute
by enacting subsections (a)(5) and (a)(1) on December 18, 1992
101. The prior subsection (a) stated:
(a) A person shall not drive, operate or be in actual physical control of the
movement of any motor vehicle while ....
75 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3731(a) (1982) (emphasis added).
102. 75 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3731(a)(1) (Supp. 1995).
103. Id.
104. Id. § 3731(a)(5)(i).
105. There seems to be no evidence in the legislative records that the Assembly heard
any offerings of scientific evidence to support election of the three-hour time period, i.e., how
the three-hour time period relates to one's blood-alcohol content while driving. See PA.
HOUSE LEGIS. J., Nov. 17, 1992, at 1853.
106. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 28-692 91989) (providing a two-hour time
period); ALASKA STAT. § 28.35.030(a)(2) (1988) (providing a four-hour time period).
107. 75 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3731 (a)(5)(ii).
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and making them effective 60 days thereafter." s Although the
legislature intended to settle the controversy of delayed blood-
alcohol test results, two Pennsylvania trial courts recently have split
on whether the amendment is constitutional.
IV. Constitutionality of Section 3731(a)(5)
In 1994, one year after section 3731(a)(5) took effect, two
Pennsylvania courts of common pleas rendered conflicting decisions
in challenges to the constitutionality of section 3731(a)(5). The
Cumberland County Court upheld the constitutionality of the
provision in Commonwealth v. Gumbert." Ten days later, the
Allegheny County Court ruled against the constitutionality of
section 3731(a)(5) in Commonwealth v. Barud.' The Pennsylva-
nia Superior Court upheld the law almost a year later in Common-
wealth v. Brehm.' The contradictory decisions reflect the
controversy surrounding section 3731(a)(5) of the Pennsylvania
Motor Vehicle Code.
The Cumberland County Court of Common Pleas considered
the novel issue of the constitutionality of section 3731(a)(5) in
Commonwealth v. Gumbert.n 2 In Gumbert, the Commonwealth
charged the defendant with violating section 3731(a), paragraphs
(1), (4), and (5)113 on January 22, 1994.114 A test of the defen-
dant's blood sample taken approximately one hour after his arrest
revealed a BAC level by weight of 0.29%.115 The defendant
moved to dismiss the charges, challenging the constitutionality of
section 3731(a)(5)." 6
The defendant first contended that subsection (a)(5) violates
Fourteenth Amendment due process rights 7 because it is uncon-
108. Id. § 3731.
109. 44 Cumb. L.J. 186 (1994).
110. 143 Pitt. Legal J. 7 (1994).
111. 144 Pa. Super. Ct. 138, 663 A.2d 712 (1995); see also Commonwealth v. Rishel, 441
Pa. Super. Ct. 584, 658 A.2d 352 (1995) (addressing the constitutionality of § 3731(a)(5) in
part).
112. 44 Cumb. L.J. 186 (1994).
113. For the respective text of these paragraphs, see supra notes 21, 5 and 4.
114. Gumbert, 44 Cumb. L.J. at 187.
115. Id. at 188.
116. Id. at 186.
117. The Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution states in part that
"no state shall deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law
.... .U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
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stitutionally vague."' 8 The defendant next claimed that subsection
(a)(5) violates due process because it does not bear a real and
substantial relationship to the statute's intended goal of keeping
roadways safe.119 Lastly, the defendant claimed the amendment
violates due process by creating an illegal presumption of driving-
under-the-influence. 2°
Since the Cumberland County Court uncovered no Pennsylva-
nia appellate cases on-point, the court relied upon related Pennsyl-
vania cases and persuasive authority from other states that have
considered similar provisions.1 21 The Honorable J. Wesley Oler,
Jr. found that the subsection withstood each of the defendant's
challenges and upheld the constitutionality of section
3731(a)(5). 122  Consequently, the superior court in Brehm
considered the same constitutional challenges and reached the same
conclusions as Gumbert on each issue.12
The Allegheny Court of Common Pleas confronted the same
constitutional issues in Commonwealth v. Barud'24 The Com-
monwealth charged defendant Barud under Motor Vehicle Code
sections 3731(a)(1) and 3731(a)(5) on December 15, 1993225 The
defendant moved to dismiss the subsection (a)(5) charge on
constitutional grounds, presenting relatively the same challenges as
defendant Gumbert.126 Lacking appellate authority, the Alleghe-
ny County Court relied on practical, common-sense analysis. In
striking contrast to the Gumbert opinion, the Honorable Walter R.
Little struck down the (a)(5) provision as unconstitutional in a
strongly worded opinion.
The Cumberland County Court and the Pennsylvania Superior
Court reached different conclusions than the Allegheny County
118. Gumbert, 44 Cumb. L.J. at 189.
119. Id.
120. Id. at 189-90.
121. Id. at 191.
122. Id. at 202.
123. Commonwealth v. Brehm, 444 Pa. Super. Ct. 138, 663 A.2d 712 (1995). The
superior court does not cite Gumbert, rather it comes to the same conclusions as Gumbert.
Due to these similarities, the superior court's findings in Brehm are discussed in this
Comment as part of the analysis of Gumbert.
124. 143 Pitt. Legal J. 7 (1994).
125. Id. at 8. The Commonwealth also charged the defendant with a summary offense
under Motor Vehicle Code § 3323, governing stop signs and yield signs.
126. Id. at 12-13. Defendant Barud actually brought a myriad of individual claims, which




Court based upon their analysis of the three fundamental challeng-
es to the constitutionality of section 3731(a)(5). These challenges
include: (1) that subsection (a)(5) is void for vagueness; (2) that it
lacks a substantial relationship to legislative goals; and (3) that the
subsection creates an illegal presumption of guilt.
A. The Void-for-Vagueness Doctrine
The defendants in Gumbert, Barud, and Brehm challenged
section 3731(a)(5) as being unconstitutionally vague. 27 Gumbert
sets forth that a valid penal statute must satisfy the void-for-
vagueness test of Kolender v. Lawson"2 to withstand a constitu-
tional challenge.129 The test requires that the statute define the
criminal offense with sufficient definiteness such that ordinary
people can understand what conduct is being prohibited and in a
manner that does not encourage arbitrary and discriminatory
enforcement.130  The test has been more simply defined as a
"rough idea of fairness' ' 131 or a requirement that statutes establish
"minimal guidelines to govern law enforcement. 1 32
1. Commonwealth v. Gumbert.- In arguing that section
3731(a)(5) is unconstitutionally vague, the defendant in Gumbert
first distinguished Commonwealth v. Mikulan,33 in which the
supreme court found that section 3731(a)(4) is not vague partly
because ample scientific literature and blood-alcohol ratio charts
are available to warn drivers of BAC levels approaching the illegal
limit." 4 Such definite guidelines, however, are not available to
warn drivers of when their BAC levels may approach the 0.10%
limit in response to section 3731(a)(5). 131 These guidelines cannot
be established, the defendant argued, because scientific evidence
127. Gumbert, 44 Cumb. L.J., at 189; Barud, 143 Pitt. Legal J. at 13; Brehm, 444 Pa.
Super. Ct. at 150, 663 A.2d at 718.
128. 461 U.S. 352 (1983).
129. Gumbert, 44 Cumb. L.J. at 191 (citing Kolender, 461 U.S. at 357).
130. Id.
131. Id. (quoting Commonwealth v. Defrancesco, 481 Pa. 595, 608, 393 A.2d 321, 327
(1978) (quoting Colten v. Kentucky, 407 U.S. 104, 110 (1972)).
132. Id. (quoting Commonwealth v. Mikulan, 504 Pa. 244, 251, 470 A.2d 1339, 1342
(1983) (quoting Kolender, 461 U.S. at 358)).
133. 504 Pa. 244, 470 A.2d 1339 (1983).
134. Brief in Support of Defendant's Motion to dismiss the Charge of 75 PA. CONS. STAT.
ANN. § 3731(a)(5) at 11, Commonwealth v. Gumbert, 44 Cumb. L.J. 186 (1994) [hereinafter




shows that individual peak blood-alcohol levels can vary significant-
ly depending on physical and social characteristics. 136 The defen-
dant concluded that the statute burdens individuals with the
"almost insurmountable task" of determining their BAC level for
a three-hour period after consuming alcohol.
137
The Cumberland County Court of Common Pleas evaluated
this challenge by considering similar challenges raised in cases from
other states. The court first considered State v. Martin,38 in
which the Arizona Court of Appeals held that a statute 139 analo-
gous to Pennsylvania Motor Vehicle Code section 3731(a)(5)
withstood the void-for-vagueness challenge."4  The Gumbert
court noted that the Arizona court did not find the statute in
question vague because the provision "establish[es] a specific,
objective criterion of a predefined BAC with which to compare an
individual's BAC."141  The Gumbert court then noted that the
Arizona court found that the law also provides fair notice to the
drinking driver that blood-alcohol testing may take place some time
after driving, and a BAC over the legal limit within that time
constitutes a violation.142 The Gumbert court concluded its
summary of Martin by noting that the Arizona court found that the
guideline calling for testing within two hours of driving supplied
specific and objective guidelines to both potential offenders and law
enforcement officers.1 43
The Gumbert court next relied on the North Dakota Supreme
Court case of City of Fargo v. Stensland,1" which also considered
a statute1 45 similar to section 3731(a)(5).'4 The court in City of
Fargo concluded that, although drivers who are under the legal
136. Id at 12-13.
137. Id. at 11.
138. 847 P.2d 619 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1992).
139. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 28-692(A)(2) (1989) (prohibiting driving with a blood-
alcohol content of 0.10% or greater as measured by a test sample taken within two hours of
operating a motor vehicle).
140. Gumbert, 44 Cumb. L.J. at 192 (citing Martin, 847 P.2d at 619).
141. Id (quoting Martin, 847 P.2d at 623).
142. Id. (quoting Martin, 847 P.2d at 623).
143. Id. (quoting Martin, 847 P.2d at 623). Gumbert also referred to the New York case
of People v. Lebron, 501 N.Y.S.2d 975, 977 (N.Y. App. Div. 1986), for support of the same
basic principles presented in Martin. Id. at 193.
144. 492 N.W.2d 591 (N.D. 1992).
145. N.D. CENT. CODE § 39-20-07(3) (1990) (prohibiting driving with a 0.10% BAC
within two hours after driving).
146. Gumbert, 44 Cumb. L.J. at 193.
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BAC limit while driving may be convicted under such provisions,
"[t]he precise blood-alcohol content at the time of operation or
control is not an element of the per se offense." '147 As noted by
the court in Gumbert, the North Dakota Supreme Court found that
legislatures pass such laws because they believe that a person who
reaches an illegal BAC within two hours of driving poses an
unreasonable risk to public safety, not because they believe the
person had a specific illegal BAC level while driving. 48
The Gumbert court concluded its analysis of the vagueness
challenge to section 3731(a)(5) by analogizing the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court analysis of section 3731(a)(4).' 49 The court
agreed with the supreme court's assessment in Commonwealth v.
Mikulan"5 ° that "the risk of erroneous judgment of alcohol
consumption" should be placed on the drinking driver."' Fur-
thermore, as the court in Mikulan attested, charts are widely
available to inform the driver of how much alcohol he or she can
consume before reaching a BAC of 0.10%.152 Thus, the Gumbert
court held that section 3731(a)(5) is not unconstitutionally vague
because it does not encourage arbitrary enforcement'53 and
drivers who drink have fair notice of the prohibited conduct."5
The superior court applied a similar rationale in Commonwealth v.
Brehm and also found that the law was not unconstitutionally
vague,'55 but the Allegheny Court of Common Pleas reached the
opposite conclusion in Commonwealth v. Barud.156
2. Commonwealth v. Barud.- In Commonwealth v. Barud,
the Allegheny Court of Common Pleas held that section 3731(a)(5)
147. Id. (quoting City of Fargo, 492 N.W.2d at 594).
148. Id. (quoting City of Fargo, 492 N.W.2d at 594-95).
149. Id. at 194.
150. 504 Pa. 244, 470 A.2d 1339 (1983).
151. Gumbert, 44 Cumb. L.J. at 195 (quoting Mikulan, 504 Pa. at 255, 470 A.2d at 1344).
152. Id. at 195-96 (citing Mikulan, 504 Pa. at 255, 470 A.2d at 1343-44).
153. Gumbert also relied on Mikulan to show that § 3731(a)(5) does not encourage
arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement under the second prong of the Kolender test. The
supreme court in Mikulan succinctly disposed of the challenge in one footnote: "There is no
room for the argument that [s]ection 3731(a)(4) encourages arbitrary and erratic
enforcement. Not only is the discretion of policemen, judges and juries limited by
ascertainable standards, law enforcement discretion is completely eliminated by this statutory
scheme once the blood alcohol content is determined." Id. at 195 (quoting Mikulan, 504 Pa.
at 253 n.8, 470 A.2d at 1343 n.8).
154. Id. at 196.
155. Commonwealth v. Brehm, 444 Pa. Super. Ct. 138, 663 A.2d 712 (1995).
156. 143 Pitt. Legal J. 7 (1994).
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is unconstitutionally vague because the average person cannot
reasonably understand what conduct the section prohibits.15 7
Despite the lack of binding Pennsylvania authority, Barud reaches
its conclusion without citing or distinguishing persuasive authority
from sister states.58  Rather, Judge Little relied on scientific
evidence and common sense arguments to support his assessment
of the issue of vagueness.159
In reaching this conclusion, the Barud court stated that section
3731(a)(5) "chooses to ignore the science of toxicology.' '1 6° The
court reasoned that physical facts such as absorption and dissipation
rates of alcohol in the body vary among individuals and circum-
stances, making it impossible for a person to understand when his
or her BAC will reach 0.10%.161 The fact that peak BAC levels
vary widely among individuals lead Judge Little to ask these
common sense questions: "How is a citizen to know when their
lawful action (drinking and driving) ripens into criminal conduct?
How can one predict when and whether a 0.10% alcohol level will
be reached within three hours of driving?
1 62
These questions prompted the Barud court to find section
3731(a)(5) unconstitutionally overbroad."6  A statute is
overbroad if its language prohibits constitutionally protected
conduct."6 The Barud court determined that section 3731(a)(5)
is overbroad because it deprives individuals of constitutionally
protected interests,1 6 apparently referring to the right to consume
alcohol and the right to drive.1"
3. Analysis of the Void-for-Vagueness Arguments.- The
Cumberland and Allegheny County Courts of Common Pleas
utilized different methods of analysis to assess the void-for-
157. Id. at 18-19.
158. Id.
159. Id.
160. Id. at 18.
161. Barud, 143 Pitt. Legal J. at 18.
162. Id. at 19.
163. Id.
164. Id. (citing Gumbert, but the superior court addressed and rejected the overbreadth
challenge in Commonwealth v. Brehm, 444 Pa. Super. Ct. 138, 148, 663 A.2d 712, 717
(1995)).
165. Id.
166. This challenge was not raised in Gumbert, but the superior court addressed and
rejected the overbreadth challenge in Commonwealth v. Brehm, 444 Pa. Super. Ct. 138, 148,
663 A.2d 712, 717 (1995).
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vagueness challenge to section 3731(a)(5). Whereas the Allegheny
County Court in Barud relied mainly on scientific evidence in
holding the section unconstitutionally vague,167 the Cumberland
County Court in Gumbert refused to dwell on toxicology or related
questions because it deemed such issues irrelevant. Since the law
prohibits driving after a person has consumed enough alcohol to
reach a BAC of 0.10% (as determined by available charts) anytime
within three hours of driving, Gumbert found that people run the
risk of erroneous judgment if they choose to drive after drink-
ing." Although Gumbert is correct that prohibiting a BAC of
0.10% within three hours of driving does provide an objective
criterion, it is questionable whether an ordinary person can
understand how to avoid culpability under this criterion.
The underlying confusion surrounding the vagueness doctrine
concerns whether the standard of "sufficiently defining prohibited
conduct" requires only that the statute proscribe an objective
criterion, or whether it also requires an understanding by an
ordinary person of how to avoid culpability. The Pennsylvania
Supreme Court in Commonwealth v. Mikulan considered this issue
and determined that "the requisite culpability for a violation of
section 3731 . . . will be established where the Commonwealth
demonstrates that the defendant knew, or should have known, that
he or she (1) was driving, operating or physically controlling the
movement of the vehicle, and (2) consumed alcoholic beverages
prior to driving." 69  Since the only culpability required under
section 3731 is that the defendant knew he or she consumed
alcohol before driving, toxicology reports of peak BAC levels are
inapposite to the vagueness challenge. The supreme court in
Mikulan infers that, to avoid culpability, an individual should not
drink before driving. 170  Thus, the objective criteria laid out in
section 3731(a)(5) sufficiently define the prohibited conduct as
required by Kolender v. Lawson.
171
167. Barud, 143 Pitt. Legal J. at 18.
168. Commonwealth v. Gumbert, 44 Cumb. L.J. 186, 195-96 (1994).
169. Commonwealth v. Mikulan, 504 Pa. 244, 260, 470 A.2d 1339, 1347 (1983).
170. Id. at 255, 470 A.2d at 1344.
171. 461 U.S. 352 (1983). The test requires that the statute define the criminal offense
with sufficient definiteness that ordinary people can understand what conduct is being




Neither Gumbert nor Barud seem to fully consider whether,
under Kolender, the three-hour period defined by section
3731(a)(5) is overly broad because it encourages arbitrary enforce-
ment. While an argument could be made that the time frame
allows a law enforcement officer the luxury of conducting the BAC
test whenever it is most convenient for the officer or most
incriminating for the defendant, the three-hour window afforded to
the officer does not promote overly broad discretion. Rather, it
creates an objective standard that enforcement officers must follow.
Section 3731(a)(5), thus, does not encourage arbitrary enforcement.
The final challenge on the issue of vagueness was that section
3731 prohibits constitutionally protected conduct.172 The court in
Barud supported this argument but provided no authority for the
inference that drinking any amount of alcohol before driving is a
constitutional right. On the contrary, the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court has held "there is no constitutional, statutory or common law
right to the consumption of ANY quantity of alcohol before driving
,173 Thus, despite the court's analysis in Barud, section
3731(a)(5) withstands the overbreadth challenge.
Perhaps the strongest argument against the new subsection,
however, is that it lacks the required rational relationship to the
statute's legislative intent. Both Gumbert and Barud considered
this challenge and again reached opposite conclusions.
R The Real and Substantial Relationship Test
A second challenge to section 3731(a)(5) is that the provision
does not bear a real and substantial relationship to the allowable
purpose for which it was enacted. a74  The well-documented
legislative goal of state DUI laws is to keep our roadways safe by
preventing people who are under the influence of alcohol from
172. Commonwealth v. Barud, 143 Pitt. Legal J. 7, 18 (1994) (citing Commonwealth v.
Stenback, 356 Pa. Super. Ct. 5, 514 A.2d 114 (1986), appeal denied, 517 Pa. 589, 534 A.2d 769
(1987)).
173. Commonwealth v. Mikulan, 504 Pa. 244, 470 A.2d 1339, 1344 (1983).
174. Defendants bring this challenge pursuant to article I. § 2 of the Pennsylvania
Constitution. which provides:
All power is inherent in the people, and all free governments are founded on their
authority and instituted for their peace, safety and happiness. For the advance-
ment of these ends they have at all times an inalienable and indefeasible right to
alter, reform or abolish their government in such a manner as they think proper.
PA. CONST. art. I, § 2.
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driving.175 The Cumberland County Court and the Pennsylvania
Superior Court have split with the Allegheny County Court on
whether section 3731(a)(5) has a real and substantial relationship
to the accomplishment of this goal.
1 76
1. Commonwealth v. Gumbert.- The Cumberland County
Court of Common Pleas in Commonwealth v. Gumbert77 relied
on the applicable California case of People v. Schrieber178 to
support its conclusion that section 3731(a)(5) legitimately furthers
the goal of Pennsylvania's DUI statute.179  In Schrieber, the
California Court of Appeals evaluated a statute analogous to
section 3731(a)(5). 1" The court concluded that a person endan-
gers the safety of others if he consumes enough alcohol that his
BAC level may ultimately reach 0.10% and then attempts to drive
home before actually reaching that level.' The Gumbert court
concurred with Schrieber and found that "[t]o allow a person to
drive after consuming sufficient alcohol to, at some point within
175. For descriptive language of the drunk-driving problem and the legislative goals of
DUI laws, see supra notes 14, 15 and accompanying text.
176. Preliminarily, it is important to reiterate that states have broad police power to
enforce alcohol restrictions in an effort to keep public roadways safe. See Mikulan, 504 Pa.
at 247-48, 470 A.2d at 1340. The Pennsylvania legislature's present exercise of this power,
however, is easily misinterpreted when considering a quote from the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court in Commonwealth v. Mikulan. Id. The supreme court recognized that "there is little
doubt that the legislature could, if it chooses, prohibit driving within a certain reasonable
time after drinking any amount of alcohol." Id at 254, 470 A.2d at 1344. The General
Assembly, however, has not chosen to implement any such restriction; it is perfectly legal to
consume a certain amount of alcohol before operating a motor vehicle in the state of
Pennsylvania. Arguments for the constitutionality of subsection (a)(5) based on the
inference that the legislature could prohibit drinking and driving entirely are not persuasive
because the legislature clearly has decided not to do so.
•177. 44 Cumb. L.J. 186 91994).
178. 119 Cal. Rptr. 812 (Cal. Ct. App. 1975).
179. Gumbert, 44 Cumb. L.J. at 199. (citing Schrieber, 119 Cal. Rptr. at 812).
180. Id.
181. Gumbert quoted the following hypothetical from Schrieber
To accept defendant's thesis that in the ordinary course of events defendant may
not be inebriated at the time of driving, but inebriated at the time of the taking
of the test, we would necessarily be required to presume that an automobile driver
would hurriedly gulp down, as in this instance he would have to have done, eight
drinks, jump in his car and hope to reach his destination before he became
intoxicated. This variety of Russian roulette leaves a very small margin for error,
inasmuch as medical studies demonstrate that the majority of ingested alcohol is
absorbed by the body within 15 to 20 minutes and that the brain, requiring as it
does a large blood supply, is one of the first organs of the body affected.
Gumbert, 44 Cumb. L.J. at 199 (quoting Schrieber, 119 Cal. Rptr. at 814).
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three hours [of driving], raise his or her BAC to .10%, would, in
the words of the California court, be playing Russian Roulette with
the lives of others on the roadways of the Commonwealth. ' '182
Again, the superior court in Commonwealth v. Brehm agreed with
the conclusion of the Gumbert court,1" while the Allegheny
County Court in Commonwealth v. Barud reached a different
conclusion." 4
2. Commonwealth v. Barud.- The Allegheny County Court
of Common Pleas in Commonwealth v. Barud concluded that
section 3731(a)(5) does not bear a substantial relationship to the
legislative goal of safe roadways.185 The court reasoned that,
under the new provision, "whether or not a person was impaired
from alcohol consumption at the time of driving or what that
person's blood alcohol content was while driving is totally irrele-
vant."186 The court opined that the real goal in enacting subsec-
tion (a)(5) was to relieve the prosecution of its burden of proof as
enunciated by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court in Commonwealth
v. Jarmanl"7 and Commonwealth v. Modaffare.1 8 As a result,
Judge Little found that section 3731(a)(5) was unconstitutional
because its goal of securing easier convictions does not substantially
relate to the statutory goal of safe roadways."'
3. Analysis of the Substantial Relationship Argu-
ments.- Commonwealth v. Gumbertt9 relies predominately on
the California Court of Appeals' decision in People v. Schrieber19t
to conclude that section 3731(a)(5) bears a real and substantial
relationship to the legislative goal of safe roadways."9  The
Schrieber court, however, based its reasoning in part on an extreme
hypothetical, quoted by Gumbert, in which a person would
"hurriedly gulp down" a large quantity of alcohol and "jump in his
car and hope to reach his destination before he became intoxicat-
182. Id. (quoting Schrieber, 119 Cal. Rptr. at 814).
183. Commonwealth v. Brehm, 444 Pa. Super. Ct. 138, 147, 663 A.2d 712, 717 (1995).
184. 143 Pitt. Legal J. 7, 17 (1994).
185. Id.
186. Id. at 16.
187. 529 Pa. 92, 601 A.2d 1229 (1992).
188. 529 Pa. 101, 601 A.2d 1233 (1992).
189. Barud, 143 Pitt. Legal J. at 16-17.
190. 944 Cumb. L.J. 186 91994).
191. 119 Cal. Rptr. 812 (Cal. Ct. App. 1975).
192. Gumbert, 44 Cumb. L.J. at 199 (citing Schrieber, 119 Cal. Rptr. at 814).
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ed."193 A more plausible hypothetical is a situation in which a
person drives to a local restaurant and consumes his meal and four
beers in an hour before driving the five minutes back to his
residence. The person in each hypothetical could be convicted
under 3731(a)(5), but society's interest in punishing the more
common occurrence of the second hypothetical is debatable.
Certainly, one who consumes large quantities of alcohol on an
empty stomach before undertaking a half-hour drive seems to pose
a safety risk.194 That person is also likely to show physical and
chemical evidence of intoxication that would support a DUI
conviction under sections 3731(a)(1) and 3731(a)(4). The real
possibility that the person in the second hypothetical could be
convicted only under section 3731(a)(5) of the statute, however,
arouses suspicion that the provision's relationship to the legislative
goals of the statute is not as substantial as it may appear at face
value. Commonwealth v. Barud95 offers the alternative conclu-
sion that the real goal of section 3731(a)(5) is to ease the prosecu-
tion's burden of proof under the statute. 96
The decisions in Commonwealth v. Jarman19 7 and Common-
wealth v. Modaffare98 certainly influenced the enactment of
subsection (a)(5). 99 It is uncertain, however, whether the Assem-
bly enacted subsection (a)(5) in response to those two Pennsylvania
Supreme Court cases in order to ease the prosecution's burden or
to punish dangerous behavior not previously covered by the statute.
The Jarman opinion seems to suggest that subsection (a)(5)
was enacted to make convictions easier to obtain. One passage in
particular seems to suggest that the legislature should draft a law
to make convictions easier under the then-existing DUI statute:
Arguably, statutes such as [those passed by other states making
it illegal to drive with a BAC of 0.10% or greater as measured
within a certain time after driving] may be more responsive to
societal concerns about drunk driving, making it easier to obtain
193. Id. (quoting Schrieber, 119 Cal. Rptr. at 814).
194. This seems to be an instance where the Schrieber court's hypothesis that intoxication
could take place as early as 15 minutes after consumption would hold true. See supra note
181.
195. 143 Pitt. Legal J. 7 (1994).
196. Id. at 16-17.
197. 529 Pa. 92, 601 A.2d 1229 (1992).
198. 529 Pa. 101, 601 A.2d 1233 (1992).
199. Barud, 143 Pitt. Legal J. at 16.
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convictions. Such arguments could properly be addressed to
our legislature, rather than to this Court, for we are constrained
to apply the plain language of the existing statute.20°
Moreover, the rather brief floor discussion by the Pennsylvania
General Assembly regarding passage of section 3731(a)(5) 1
supports the argument that section 3731(a)(5) was enacted to make
DUI convictions easier under state law. Indeed, Pennsylvania State
House Representative Kevin Blaum described the proposed
subsection (a)(5) as "an agreed-upon amendment" worked on by
the House Judiciary Committee and the District Attorneys
Association which will "correct some court cases ... which have
damaged the DUI [laws of Pennsylvania]."'  The same legisla-
tive records lack any discussion or expert testimony of whether a
person with a BAC of 0.10% within three hours after driving
endangers the safety of others on state roadways.203
Even if the General Assembly enacted subsection (a)(5) solely
to ease the prosecution's burden of proof in DUI proceedings, the
provision is still constitutional under the substantial relationship
test as long as it also furthers the intended goal of section 3731.2
The amendment arguably protects motorists because it keeps
people who have been drinking from then driving.2 °' The societal
concerns of a person's BAC three hours after driving, however, are
likely minor without scientific evidence showing how one's BAC
within three hours after driving relates to the time of driving.
Unlike the abundant scientific support for subsection (a)(4) that a
person over 0.10% BAC is intoxicated,' there is not such
scientific evidence to support subsection (a)(5). With no legislative
intent other than ease of prosecution, the (a)(5) amendment does
not bear a real and substantial relationship to the goals of prevent-
ing driving under the influence.
200. Jarman, 529 Pa. at 95 n.1, 601 A.2d at 1230 n.1 (emphasis added).
201. PA. HOUSE LEGIS. J., Nov. 17, 1992, at 1853.
202. Id.
203. Id.
204. For descriptive language of the drunk-driving problem and the legislative goals of
DUI laws, see supra notes 14, 15 and accompanying text.
205. In Commonwealth v. Mikulan, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court first established that
an average person with a 0.10% BAC was intoxicated, and then had no problem concluding
that the "chilling effect" subsection (a)(4) had on a person's "'right' to drink to the cutting
edge of sobriety" was a restriction well within the statute's legislative goals. Commonwealth
v. Mikulan, 504 Pa. 244, 254, 470 A.2d, 1339, 1344 (1983).
206. See id at 250, 470 a.2d at 1342.
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A constitutional analysis similar to that of the rational
relationship test is the inquiry of whether a law creates an illegal
presumption of guilt. The analysis now shifts from legislative goals
and intent to how legislative action affects treatment of the
defendant. Once again, the Cumberland and Allegheny County
Courts of Common Pleas have split on whether section 3731(a)(5)
creates an illegal presumption of guilt,' and again, the superior
court has sided with the conclusion drawn by the Cumberland
County Court in Commonwealth v. Gumbert.2°
C. Illegal Statutory Presumptions
The third major challenge to the constitutionality of section
3731(a)(5) is that the provision violates the defendant's due process
rights by creating an illegal presumption of law.2" A presump-
tion is a rule by which a known fact gives rise to the existence of
an unknown, but "presumed" fact."' Although presumptions
help legislatures and courts operate efficiently,211 presumptions in
criminal cases may not reduce the prosecution's burden of proving
every element of the offense charged against the defendant beyond
a reasonable doubt.212 Presumptions that shift the burden of
persuasion to the defendant to disprove his or her guilt are invalid
because they reduce the prosecution's burden. 3  Likewise,
presumptions that prohibit the defendant from presenting evidence
in his or her favor are also invalid.214
The United States Supreme Court in County Court of Ulster
County v. Allen 2 5 drew an important distinction between permis-
sive and mandatory presumptions. Permissive presumptions permit,
but do not require, a factfinder to infer a presumed fact from the
207. Compare Commonwealth v. Gumbert, 44 Cumb. L.J. 186, 199 (1994) with
Commonwealth v. Barud, 143 Pitt. Legal J. 7, 18 (1994).
208. See Commonwealth v. Brehm, 444 Pa. Super. Ct. 138, 150,663 a.2d 712, 718 (1995);
see also Commonwealth v. Rishel, 441 Pa. Super. Ct. 584, 658 A.2d 352 (1995).
209. Gumbert, 44 Cumb. L.J. at 199.
210. Jennifer L. Pariser, Note, In Vino Veritas: The Truth About Blood Alcohol
Presumptions in State Drunk Driving Law, 64 N.Y.U. L. REV. 141, 153 (1989).
211. Presumptions aid the legislature and judiciary when there is high probability that the
known fact will result in the presumed fact, but proving the presumed fact directly is difficult
and time consuming. Id. at 155.
212. Id. at 156 (citing In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970)).
213. Id. (citing Sandstrom v. Montana, 442 U.S. 510 (1979)).
214. Id. (citing Sandstrom, 442 U.S. at 523-34).
215. 442 U.S. 140 (1979).
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proof of a related known fact.216 The defendant does not neces-
sarily have to rebut a permissive presumption, because the
factfinder can attribute whatever weight it wishes to the infer-
ence.217  A mandatory presumption, however, requires the fact-
finder to find that the presumed fact is true upon proof of the
known fact.218 If the presumed fact requires the defendant to
disprove his or her guilt, the prosection's burden has been reduced
and the presumption is illegal.
219
1. Commonwealth v. Gumbert.- The defendant in the
Cumberland County case of Commonwealth v. Gumbert2 argued
that subsection (a)(5) creates an illegal mandatory presumption.22'
According to the defendant's argument, the known fact is that the
defendant had a 0.10% BAC within three hours after driving.222
The alleged presumed fact is that the defendant had a 0.10% or
greater BAC while driving.21' The presumption allegedly is
mandatory because the statute defines that proof of the known fact
alone mandates a conviction under section 3731(a)(5). 24 The
presumption is illegal, the defendant argued, because it allows
conviction without requiring the Commonwealth to carry its burden
of proving the presumed fact that the accused was driving while
under the influence of alcohol.2'
The Cumberland County Court of Common Pleas in Gumbert
relied on persuasive authority of sister states and held that section
3731(a)(5) did not create any mandatory presumptions of law.
226
The Gumbert court relied on State v. Martin,227 in which the
Arizona Court of Appeals held that a statute analogous to section
3731(a)(5) defines the essential elements of the crime and does not
create a mandatory presumption.22 The Gumbert court conclud-
216. Pariser, supra note 210, at 158 (citing Ulster County, 442 U.S. at 157).
217. Id. (citing Ulster County, 442 U.S. at 157).
218. Id. at 159 (citing Ulster County, 442 U.S. at 157).
219. Id. (citing Ulster County, 442 U.S. at 157).
220. 44 Cumb. L.J. 186 (1994).
221. Id. at 199.




226. Gumbert, 44 Cumb. L.J. at 202.
227. 847 P.2d 619 (Ariz. App. Ct. 1992).
228. Gumbert, 44 Cumb. L.J. at 201 (quoting Martin, 847 P.2d at 624). The Arizona
court found "[tihe essential element of [the Arizona provision] is having a BAC of 0.10
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ed that driving with a certain BAC level is not an element of the
offense.229
The Gumbert court then analyzed the affirmative defense
offered under section 3731(a)(1)," which permits a defendant to
prove that alcohol consumed after driving raised his or her BAC
level above 0.10%. The court compared the defense to an Arizona
affirmative defense provision E" and noted that in Cacavas v.
Bowen, 2 the Arizona Court of Appeals held that the affirmative
defense provision of a law similar to section 3731(a)(5) did not
"establish an essential element of the crime and then place the
burden of disproving that defined element on the accused.
233
The Gumbert court relied on that decision in finding that sections
3731(a)(5) and 3731(a)(1) do not shift the prosecution's burden of
proof to the defendant. 2-  The Pennsylvania Superior Court in
Commonwealth v. Brehm also relied on Cacavas v. Bowen in
finding that the new law did not shift the prosecution's burden of
proof.
3 5
2. Commonwealth v. Barud.- The Allegheny Court of
Common Pleas in Commonwealth v. BarudE 6 agreed with Gum-
bert that section 3731(a)(5) does not create the mandatory
presumption of a 0.10% or greater BAC while driving.21 7  The
court in Barud concluded, however, that section 3731(a)(5) creates
an illegal presumption by eliminating any defense that the accused
percent within two hours of driving .... [T]he state must still prove beyond a reasonable
doubt that defendant's [BAC] was 0.10 or more within two hours of driving." Id. (quoting
Martin. 847 P.2d at 624).
229. Id.
230. This section provides:
it shall be a defense to a prosecution under subsection (a)(5) if the person proves
by a preponderance of the evidence that the person consumed alcohol after the
last instance in which he drove, operated or was in actual physical control of the
vehicle and that the amount of alcohol by weight in his blood would not have
exceeded 0.10% at the time of the test but for such consumption.
75 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3731(a)(1).
231. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 28-692(B) (1989).
232. 811 P.2d 366 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1991).
233. Gumbert, 44 Cumb. L.J. at 200 (quoting Cacavas, 811 P.2d at 368).
234. Id. at 200-01. Gumbert also relied on the Minnesota case of State v. Chirpich, 392
N.W.2d 34 (Minn. Ct. App. 1986), for similar support. Gumbert, 44 Cumb. L.J. at 201.
235. Commonwealth v. Brehm, 444 Pa. Super. Ct. 138, 150, 663 A.2d 712, 717-18 (1995);
see also Commonwealth v. Rishel, 441 Pa. Super. Ct. 584, 658 A.2d 352 (1995).
236. 143 Pitt. Legal J. 7 (1994).
237. Id. at 17. The statute "does not establish a presumption that a person's blood
alcohol content was over 0.10% at the time of driving based on a later reading." Id.
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was not under the influence while driving, thus alleviating the
prosecution's burden of proof under the statute. 8
Although subsection (a)(1) provides a possible affirmative
defense to subsection (a)(5), the Barud court concluded that
subsection (a)(1) further evidences the elimination of any defense
related to driving. 9  Under the pre-existing subsections (a)(1)
and (a)(4)24 of the DUI statute, the Barud court noted, the
accused had the opportunity to present a defense through factual
evidence and expert testimony that he or she was not under the
influence while driving.241 That opportunity, however, is not
available under subsection (a)(5). Section 3731(a)(1) does not
provide any legitimate defense related to driving, but rather permits
a defense that alcohol consumed after driving caused the defen-
dant's BAC to rise to 0.10% or greater.242 Without a legitimate
defense for the accused to prove innocence under section
3731(a)(5), the Barud court concluded that the section alleviates
the Commonwealth's burden and creates an illegal mandatory pre-
sumption of guilt.
243
3. Analysis of the Illegal Presumption Argu-
ments.- Although Gumbert relies on Cacavas v. Bowen2' to
analogize an affirmative defense provision similar to subsection
(a)(1),245 the Arizona provision does not appear analogous
because, unlike subsection (a)(1), it clearly provides a defense
related to driving.2' A defendant subject to the Arizona provi-
sion can use factual evidence and expert testimony to assess that he
or she was not under the influence of alcohol while driving.247
This defense is not available under Pennsylvania Motor Vehicle
Code section 3731(a)(1). Consequently, the Gumbert analysis of
section 3731(a)(1) is not conclusive of whether section 3731(a)(5)
unconstitutionally shifts the burden of proof to the defendant.
238. Id. at 18.
239. Id.
240. For text of subsections (a)(1) and (a)(4), see supra notes 21 and 5.
241. Barud, 143 Pitt. Legal J. at 18.
242. Id.
243. Id.
244. 811 P.2d 366 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1991).
245. Commonwealth v. Gumbert, 44 Cumb. L.J. 186, 200 (1994).
246. ARZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 28-692(B). The section provides an affirmative defense
"if the person did not have an alcohol concentration of 0.10 or more at the time of driving




To determine whether section 3731(a)(5) wrongfully shifts the
burden to the defendant, the burden must first be defined. To
sustain a conviction pursuant to section 3731(a)(5), the prosecution
must prove the defendant, (1) operated or controlled a motor
vehicle, and (2) had a BAC of 0.10% within three hours after
driving.2 These essential elements of the offense do not require
the prosecution to prove the accused had a certain BAC level while
driving. Since the offense does not include this burden, there can
be no shifting of the burden to the defendant.
Although technically section 3731(a)(5) defines a new offense
rather than creates a mandatory presumption of driving under the
influence of alcohol,249 the new offense necessarily begs the
question of why subsection (a)(5) criminalizes behavior not directly
associated with driving. This inquiry inevitably returns the focus of
analysis to the relationship between the offense and the statute's
legislative intent as discussed in Part IV.B of this Comment. The
subsection appears constitutional after an analysis of illegal
statutory presumptions, but only to the extent that the subsection
is shown to be rationally related to the goals of the statute.
4. The Post-Driving "Guzzle" Defense of Subsection (a)(1).-
The new offense defined in section 3731(a)(5) inherently
eliminates the defense that the defendant did not have the requisite
0.10% BAC while driving."0 The affirmative defense of section
3731(a)(1) provides little solace because it does not relate to the
time of driving. 51 Section 3731(a)(1) applies only if the defen-
dant consumed alcohol after driving and can prove that the later
consumption, as opposed to alcohol consumed before driving,
caused the illegal BAC level. 52
Since section 3731(a)(1) provides the only substantive defense
to section 3731(a)(5), drivers who believe they have a legal BAC
while driving, but who suspect their BAC may rise above 0.10% at
a later point, are seemingly encouraged to consume large quantities
of alcohol if pulled over. Since the driver has no chance of proving
he was not driving under the influence his or her only way of
248. 75 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3731(a)(5).
249. Gumbert, 44 Cumb. L.J. at 200-01.
250. Commonwealth v. Barud, 143 Pitt. Legal J. 7, 18 (1994).
251. Id.
252. 75 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3731(a)(1) (Supp. 1995). For the text of subsection
(a)(1), see supra note 230.
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proving innocence is to try to utilize section 3731(a)(1). Joseph E.
Vogrin, defense attorney for defendant Barud summarized this
anomaly: "If a driver gets out of the car after a stop and guzzles
a beer, he is allowed to prove he was under 0.10 two minutes
earlier. A driver who doesn't guzzle the beer doesn't have that
defense. It makes no sense.
''2 3
The challenges to the constitutionality of section 3731(a)(5)
ultimately will be decided by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court.
The supreme court recently took jurisdiction over the issue in light
of the Commonwealth v. Barud holding that section 3731(a)(5) is
unconstitutional. 24  Whatever the decision, the supreme court
ruling will have a profound effect on Pennsylvania DUI Practice.
V. The Future of Section 3731(a)(5)
A. Treatment by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court
1. The Pending Appeal.- On October 20, 1994, Judge
Walter R. Little denied the Commonwealth's motion to stay his
Commonwealth v. Barud55  decision, which held section
3731(a)(5) unconstitutional.56 The Commonwealth then appealed
the Barud decision to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, 7 request-
ing it stay the holding and take jurisdiction over the issue. 8 The
Pennsylvania Supreme Court took jurisdiction over the matter on
October 31, 1994,"5 and granted the motion to stay the lower
court order on January 5, 1995.2 0
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court's stay of Commonwealth v.
Barud means that defense counsel may not cite the decision as
253. Mary Ellen Fox, Delayed DUI Testing Under Fire: "Three-Hour" Rule Struck Down;
High Court Asked To Hear Case, PA. L. WKLY., Oct. 31, 1994, at 23.
254. Commonwealth v. Barud, 143 Pitt. Legal J. 7 (1994), appeal docketed, No. 64 W.D.
(Pa. Oct. 31, 1994).
255. 143 Pitt. Legal J. 7 (1994).
256. Fox, supra note 253, at 1, 23.
257. The Commonwealth filed the direct appeal pursuant to 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN.
§ 722(7) (1975), which allows direct appeals from courts of common pleas orders declaring
a statute of the Commonwealth invalid as repugnant to the Constitution of the United States
or of the Commonwealth. Commonwealth v. Mikulan, 504 Pa. 244, 247 n.5, 470 A.2d 1339,
1340 n.5 (1983).
258. Fox, supra note 253, at 1.
259. Commonwealth v. Barud, 143 Pitt. Legal J. 7 (1994), appeal docketed, No. 64 W.D.
(Pa. Oct. 31, 1994).




authority for the argument that section 3731(a)(5) is unconstitution-
al. The immediate confusion resulting from the Barud decision
justifies supreme court interference to consider the merits of the
holding. The confusion is heightened in Allegheny County, where
Barud was decided, since two other judges in the county had
previously upheld the constitutionality of section 3731(a)(5).
261
2. Supreme Court Analysis.- Having stayed the Barud
holding, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court must now decide the
substantive constitutionality issue. Although the Supreme Court
decided Commonwealth v. Mikulan,262 in 1983, the case remains
a useful analogy of how the court may hold. The Mikulan court
upheld the constitutionality of section 3731(a)(4), which criminal-
ized driving with a blood-alcohol content of 0.10% or greater.26
The supreme court in Mikulan noted in detail the broad state
police power in regulating highway safety, especially when alcoholic
beverages are involved.26 The court also described at length the
deaths caused by drunk drivers on state highways. 265 The strong
deference given by the court to the Pennsylvania legislature in
matters concerning drunk driving suggests the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court will uphold section 3731(a)(5). Societal outcries
and concerns over drunk driving accidents. and fatalities likely will
overshadow arguments that section(a)(5) does not rationally relate
to these concerns.
266
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court may find further support for
section 3731(a)(5) from states that have upheld similar provisions.
In Commonwealth v. Gumbert,267 the Cumberland County Court
of Common Pleas demonstrated that other states have upheld
similar provisions. 2 s Such reliance on persuasive authority from
other states likely will influence the supreme court more than the
analysis in Commonwealth v. Barud, in which the Allegheny
County Court of Common Pleas declared section 3731(a)(5)
unconstitutional without citing any authority. Despite this lack of
261. Fox, supra note 253, at 1.
262. 504 Pa. 240, 470 A.2d 1339 (1983).
263. Id.
264. Id. at 247-48, 470 A.2d at 1340-41.
265. Id. at 248-49, 470 A.2d at 1340-41.
266. See supra part IV.B.
267. 44 Cumb. L.J. 186 (1994).
268. Id. Arizona, North Dakota, New York, California, and Minnesota are the five states
cited for comparison in Gumbert. Id.
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authority, closer analysis of Judge Little's opinion proves it
meritorious on a common sense level. Yet, if the supreme court
considers both cases in its analysis, it likely will find the analytical
approach of Judge Oler in Gumbert more persuasive from a legal
analysis viewpoint than Judge Little's narrative in Barud. The
analysis in Gumbert is further bolstered by the Pennsylvania
Superior Court's decision in Commonwealth v. Brehm, which
upholds the law with similar analysis.
Further evidence that the Pennsylvania Supreme Court will
uphold section 3731(a)(5) appears in Commonwealth v. Jarman.269
The supreme court opinion seems to rally support for the type of
legislative action that resulted in the passage of the (a)(5) amend-
ment.27° In reversing a section 3731(a)(4) conviction, the supreme
court noted that other states employ statutes that would support a
conviction under the facts of Jarman. Since the limited plain
language of the Pennsylvania statute constrained the court in its
decision, the court instructed that arguments for a statute that
made convictions easier should be addressed to the legislature.2
It is doubtful the supreme court would strike down a law it
appeared to endorse in its own recent decision.
In light of its recent ruling in Commonwealth v. Yarger
however, the supreme court may determine that section 3731(a)(5)
unfairly limits defense rights in DUI prosecution. Although the
court in Yarger held that the Commonwealth need not extrapolate
subsequent BAC test results back to the time of driving, the court
also noted that the defendant had a right to offer evidence that he
or she had a legal BAC while driving.274 Even Pennsylvania
Supreme Court Justice Ralph J. Cappy, who dissented in Jarman
and Modaffare, recognized that the defendant had a right to a
defense related to the time of driving. 5 Whether this recognized
right to defend is strong enough to strike down legislative action
concerning tougher DUI laws, however, is doubtful. The Pennsyl-
vania Supreme Court likely will uphold the constitutionality of
269. 529 Pa. 92, 601 A.2d 1229 (1992).
270. Id. at 95, 601 A.2d at 1230.
271. Id.
272. Id. at 95 n.1, 601 A.2d at 1230 n.1.
273. 538 Pa. 329, 648 A.2d 529 (1994).
274. Id. at 335, 648 A.2d at 531.




section 3731(a)(5) in deference to the state's broad police powers
in regulation of drinking and driving on state roadways.
276
VI. Conclusion
The latest amendment to Pennsylvania's DUI statute prohibits
a person from having a blood-alcohol content of 0.10% by weight
within three hours, or a reasonable additional time, after driv-
ing.277 The Pennsylvania legislature enacted section 3731(a)(5) to
solve the apparent extrapolation problems created in Common-
wealth v. Jarman278 and Commonwealth v. Modaffare.279 Subse-
quent case law, however, has proven that the legislature acted
prematurely in amending the statute.' Recent case law has
demonstrated that the pre-existing DUI statute was both viable and
sufficient.21
The constitutionality of Pennsylvania Motor Vehicle Code
section 3731(a)(5) has been challenged in recent trial court
cases.2" The challenges propose that subsection (a)(5) is void-
for-vagueness, lacks a substantial relationship to legislative goals,
and creates an illegal presumption of guilt.' In light of the
divergent authority at the trial court level, the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court will hear the issue.2 4 Although the challenges
have merit, the supreme court likely will uphold the constitutional-
ity of section 3731(a)(5) in deference to the state's broad police
powers in regulation of drinking and driving on state roadways.
Robert J. Schefter
276. See supra notes 12, 13 and accompanying text.
277. 75 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3731(a)(5) (Supp. 1994).
278. 529 Pa. 92, 601 A.2d 1229 (1992).
279. 529 Pa. 101, 601 A.2d 1233 (1992).
280. See supra notes 79-96 and accompanying text.
281. See supra note 91-96 and accompanying text.
282. See supra part IV.
283. See supra part IV.
284. See supra text accompanying notes 255-61.
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